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COMMENTS
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TRANSFER PRICING SYSTEMS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND SOUTH KOREA
I. INTRODUCTION
The rise of multinational corporations (MNCs) within today's
global economic structure has created interesting questions for
countries world wide. MNCs use cross border parent-subsidiary
relationships to achieve greater efficiency, gain economies of scale,
and exploit differences in national taxation rates. 1 These relation-
ships provide flexibility in methods of distribution and in control
of production costs.2 The rise of MNCs has created the need for a
system of taxation that can keep up with this changing global cor-
porate environment.
In response to the changing global economy, countries have
promulgated transfer pricing systems. Transfer pricing laws tax in-
tercompany "sales of goods, the provision of services, the licensing
of patents and know-how, and the granting of loans." 3 The Inter-
nal Revenue Code section 482 contains the U.S. transfer pricing
laws. The U.S. Treasury Department has also promulgated de-
tailed regulations interpreting the basic provision.4
The complexity and prominence of MNCs today has
prompted other countries to develop their own transfer pricing
systems. South Korea (Korea) enacted new laws in December
1. See Don P. Yang, Korean Group Predicts Proposed Transfer Pricing Regs. Will
Have Unintended Consequences, TAX NOTES INT'L, Aug. 2, 1993, at 483, available in
LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNI File.
2. See Thomas Borstell, Introduction: A Special Report Prepared by Thomas Borstell
of Price Waterhouse, Dusseldorf, INT'L TAX REV., Apr. 1997, at 4. Related entities within
such MNCs generate more than half of the world's trade volume. See Ernst & Young
Transfer Pricing 1997 Global Survey, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Sept. 8, 1997, 1 4, avail-
able in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNI File.
3. Suk Hi Kim, International Transfer Pricing, in READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS 420 (Robert Z. Aliber & Reid W. Click eds., 1993).
4. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (1997).
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1995 to bring its transfer pricing system up to par with current in-
ternational standards.5 The new laws took effect on January 1,
1996.6 These new laws are found in the Law for the Coordination
of International Tax Affairs (LCITA) and its accompanying Presi-
dential Enforcement Decree (PED). Korea's laws are modeled af-
ter the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment's (OECD)7 Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises and Tax Administrations (OECD Guidelines). 8 Fur-
thermore, the new rules update Korea's Corporation Tax Law
(CTL), which primarily regulates domestic transactions.
9
This Comment discusses the current developments in U.S.
and Korean transfer pricing laws, relating specifically to tangible
goods with occasional reference to laws regarding intangible
goods. The Comment then analyzes the major differences and
similarities of the two systems. The Comment also discusses some
of the structural and economic factors that have compelled both
countries to develop their particular transfer pricing systems.
What emerges is a better understanding of the relative merits and
flaws of each system. The Comment will occasionally make rec-
ommendations for change.
II. WHAT Is TRANSFER PRICING?
Transfer pricing represents the mechanism by which tax
authorities levy adjustments to "clearly reflect income attributable
to controlled transactions, and to prevent the avoidance of taxes
with respect to such transactions. '" 10 A controlled transaction is a
5. See J.Y. Lee & S.L. Moller, New Law Aims for Global Coverage, INT'L TAX
REV., Apr. 1996, at 19.
6. See Sai Ree Yun, Korea's New Transfer Pricing Rules Favor 'Best Method' Ap-
proach, 8 J. INT'L TAX'N 38 (1997).
7. See Jacques Sasseville, The OECD Model Tax Convention Is Revised, 4 J. INT'L
TAX'N 129 (1993). OECD succeeded the Organization for European Economic Coopera-
tion, which was set up to implement the Marshall plan after World War II. See id The
OECD works to carry out various international economic policies. See id
8. See Yun, supra note 6, at 38.
9. See Lee & Moller, supra note 5, at 19. Using rules that primarily governed do-
mestic corporations caused conflict among non-domestic parties. See id. CTL remains in
effect for domestic transactions. See id. Korea's laws closely follow the heels of the July
1995 OECD Guidelines. See id.
10. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(1) (1997). Because product comparability is most impor-
tant when using methods such as the CUP, this distinction becomes especially important in
these cases.
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transfer of goods between related companies. 11 Controlled trans-
actions rarely reflect the true taxable income attributable to two
unrelated parties. 12 In contrast, an uncontrolled transaction in-
volves a transfer of goods between unrelated parties. 13 Parties to a
controlled transaction may allocate a higher proportion of income
to another related party in a relatively low tax jurisdiction.
14
In effect, transactions between two related parties might not
necessarily be at the market price.15 For example, a parent com-
pany in a high tax jurisdiction can avoid taxes by selling inventory
at below market prices to its subsidiary in a low tax jurisdiction.
16
When the subsidiary sells the goods, the resulting income is taxed
at the lower rate or the subsidiary country locale and not the
higher tax rate of the parent country. This artificially deflates the
parent company's profit, ultimately minimizing its tax burden.
17
Obviously, transfer pricing assumes that we should view two
related companies as separate legal and economic entities.18 In
contrast, MNCs argue that both entities constitute one economic
unit. 19
Economists have argued that "the ability to manipulate trans-
fer prices is a major reason for the existence of multinational en-
terprises." 20  Potential for abuse exists because MNCs need to
avoid foreign exchange controls and similar restrictions on the
movement of international capital.21 Thus, countries must allocate
sufficient time and resources to develop effective systems that will
address the business requirements of the MNC without exacer-
11. See Masahiro Yoshimura, The "Tax War" Between the United States and Japan
Under Internal Revenue Code Sec. 482: Is There a Solution?, 12 Wis. INT'L L.J. 401, 402
(1994).
12. See Eugene E. Lester, International Transfer Pricing Rules: Unconventional Wis-
dom, 2 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 283, 285-86 (1995).
13. See generally Sandra Reid Robertson, Transfer Pricing Solutions in the Global
Economy, 3 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMp. L. 177, 184 (1996) (describing the distinction be-
tween controlled and uncontrolled taxpayers).
14. See Derek Devgun, International Fiscal Wars for the Twenty-First Century: An
Assessment of Tax-Based Trade Retaliation, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 353, 360 (1996).
15. See Lester, supra note 12, at 286.
16. See generally Kim, supra note 3, at 408 (illustrating how a company can use trans-
fer pricing to minimize its tax burden).
17. See id.
18. See id. at 413.
19. See id.
20. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm's Length: A Study in the Evolu-
tion of US. International Taxation, 15 VA. TAX REV. 89,90 (1995).
21. See Devgun, supra note 14, at 359-60.
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bating the potential for abuse.
Some of the latest developments in the field reveal the poten-
tial for transfer pricing controversy between the United States and
Korea. Lawrence Gibbs, the former IRS Commissioner, recently
warned Korean companies operating in the United States that the
IRS would toughen its implementation of transfer pricing laws.
22
The IRS issued the warning notwithstanding the fact that Korean
companies operating in the United States are generally not as
profitable as other foreign rivals.23 During his first presidential
campaign, President Clinton singled out the issue of transfer pric-
ing abuse by claiming that he would collect an additional forty-
four billion dollars through taxing of MNCs. 24 As further evidence
of support for such enforcement measures, Congressional mem-
bers agreed that multinational companies were not paying their
fair share of taxes.
25
Similarly, the Korean tax authorities recently announced
plans to examine the transfer pricing practices of some 400 com-
panies operating in Korea. 26 Companies under scrutiny would in-
clude large Korean corporations, foreign-invested companies, and
local branches of foreign-owned companies.
27
III. UNITED STATES TRANSFER PRICING SYSTEM
The U.S. system of taxing MNCs has developed over a num-
ber of years. Since 1917, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
has had the authority to allocate income and deductions among af-
filiated entities.28 The 1928 Revenue Act expanded this power.29
22. See Yonhap, Former IRS Official Warns Tougher Audits for Korean Cos., ASIA
PULSE (Seoul), Apr. 8, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library.
23. See id. In practical terms, Commissioner Gibbs announced that the IRS would
use an audit technique called the "fragmented corporations" approach. Under this ap-
proach, the IRS must apply transfer pricing laws to companies doing business with one
another. These transfer pricing laws, however, do not apply to commonly controlled com-
panies. See id.
24. See Michael Avramovich, Note, Intercompany Transfer Pricing Regulations Under
Internal Revenue Code Section 482: The Noose Tightens on Multinational Corporations, 28
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 915, 924-25 (1995).
25. See id. at 923-24. The remark was made by Congressional members in 1990. See
id.
26. See Yong K. Kim, Korean NTA Ready to Investigate Transfer Prices of 400 Com-
panies, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Nov. 6, 1997, available in LEXIS, Library, 97 TNI 215-
14.
27. See id.
28. See Sandra Reid Robertson, Transfer Pricing Solutions in the Global Economy, 3
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In the 1960s, the IRS Commissioner increased its application of
section 482 to transactions between U.S. taxpayers and their re-
lated foreign entities.
30
The recent promulgation of the Final Treasury Regulations
(Regulations) in 1994, and the preceding Temporary and Proposed
Regulations in 1993, resulted from a "White Paper" study pro-
duced by the Treasury Department. 31 Congress initiated this study
out of concern stemming from a desire to enact a more thorough
system of transfer pricing administration.32 Many consider the re-
sulting U.S. Regulations to be the most aggressive implementation
of transfer pricing administration.
33
Under the U.S. Treasury Regulations, compliance with the
arm's length standard determines the level of adjustments under
section 482. 34 It states that "[a] controlled transaction meets the
arm's length standard if the results of the transaction are consis-
tent with the results that would have been realized if uncontrolled
taxpayers had engaged in the same transaction under the same cir-
cumstances." 35
If the IRS determines that the company did not engage in an
arm's length transaction, the IRS can make a corresponding ad-
justment.36 If such an adjustment is made, the taxpayer can chal-
lenge its validity by proving, in court, that the IRS-imposed ad-
ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 177,181 (1996).
29. See id.
30. See i at 181-82.
31. See Pamela L. Kayfetz & Leo B. Helzel, Transfer Pricing: Achieving Fair Na-
tional Taxation of International Transactions, 3 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 193, 202
(1996). The White Paper outlined four key concepts:
1. At the time a tax return is filed, the taxpayer should document contempora-
neous pricing or significant mispricing.
2. The IRS should aggressively pursue pricing information through administra-
tive summons and Section 982 formal document requests. IRS economists and
counsel should become involved early in the case.
3. The procedures for determining the appropriate transfer price of intangibles
should be revised, and appropriate pricing readjustments should be made over
time.
4. The rules for acceptable cost-sharing agreements should be made more spe-
cific. They should require an arm's length "buying" charge for preexisting un-
shared research.
Kim, supra note 3, at 417-18.
32. See Kayfetz & Helzel, supra note 31, at 202.
33. See id.
34. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1).
35. Id.
36. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(2).
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justments were "capricious, arbitrary or unreasonable.
'" 37
The applicability of transfer pricing ranges from manufac-
tured goods to intangibles such as patents, copyrights, and pay-
ments for professional or technical services. 38 Furthermore, sec-
tion 482 targets two potential areas of tax avoidance. The first
area focuses on U.S. taxpayers operating in "tax haven" jurisdic-
tions.39 The second area focuses on the U.S. operations of foreign
multinational companies.
40
Despite the perceived abuses by MNCs with respect to inter-
company transfer pricing, many have criticized the United States
for its application of such vigorous standards against U.S. opera-
tions of foreign MNCs. 41 Some argue that the large U.S. budget
deficit has been the impetus in the implementation of the tougher
standards that unduly burden such companies. 42 As a result, po-
tential claims of discrimination may arise.
43
Critics also warn that a strict enforcement policy is short-
sighted. They claim that it does not take into consideration the
long-term economic effects of a hostile business environment on
foreign-owned MNCs.44 Critics also assert that MNCs are more
focused on business concerns, such as maximizing shareholder
wealth, and are not concentrating on tax avoidance. 45 Such argu-
ments, however, should not detract from the importance and mag-
nitude of transfer pricing tax avoidance.
IV. KOREAN TRANSFER PRICING SYSTEM
Since 1996, Korean authorities may request MNCs to select
and report "the most reasonable method" for producing an arm's
length result.46 Although tax authorities will not levy penalties for
failure to report the method on a voluntary basis, they will gener-
37. Yoshimura, supra note 11, at 409.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 406.
40. See id. at 406-07.
41. See generally Avramovich, supra note 24, at 926-27.
42. See id.
43. See generally Devgun, supra note 14, at 355-56 (1996) (noting that claims of dis-
criminatory practice occur when one jurisdiction does not treat citizens of another jurisdic-
tion consistent with the expectations of the latter jurisdiction).
44. See Avramovich, supra note 24, at 926.
45. See id. at 928-29.
46. See PED art. 7(1).
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ally not give that company favorable treatment.47 Failure to vol-
untarily comply has two main consequences. First, auditors may
place more priority on scrutinizing such taxpayers.48 Second, in
the event of an underreporting of income, companies that do not
report "the most reasonable method" will not get the benefit of a
waiver for penalties.49 These unstated penalties will probably
force many companies to comply with reporting requirements.
The Law for the Coordination of International Tax Affairs
(LCITA), and its accompanying Presidential Enforcement Decree
(PED) update Korea's pre-existing Corporation Tax Law (CTL).
50
As mentioned earlier, the CTL mainly governed transactions with
domestic implications. 51 The CTL adjusts income from the domes-
tic transaction when "the transaction unreasonably reduce[s] tax
liability." 52 Previously, the domestic standard was also applied to
international transactions. Subsequently, this system was updated
to comply with international standards as the volume of cross bor-
der transactions involving Korean companies increased. The new
international transfer pricing law required companies to use an
arm's length standard. The old domestic law, however, maintained
the "unreasonable reduction" standard. Some have argued that
this disparity might allow a party to claim "under domestic law,
but not under the new law, that although a price is different from
the prevailing market price, this has not unreasonably reduced tax
liability. "53
Although the United States utilizes a more rigorous transfer
pricing system, Korea's newly enacted laws have the potential for
substantially increased enforcement of transfer pricing abuse. De-
spite such potential, as will be discussed subsequently, structural
differences between the United States and Korea prevents the lat-
ter from enforcing its transfer pricing laws with the same level of
rigor.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See Lee & Moller, supra note 5, at 19.
51. See id.
52 Id.
53. Id.
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One such structural difference is the disparity in national eco-
nomic output. Korea has used direct foreign investment as the en-
gine of economic growth.54 Relaxed transfer pricing regulations
will facilitate continued foreign direct investment in Korea. As a
result of its current financial crisis, increased pressure to attract
foreign investment will play an important role in future transfer
pricing policy. Furthermore, Korea can substitute other measures,
such as foreign exchange controls, repatriation limits, and other
foreign investment regulations, to control capital movement.
55
V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TRANSFER PRICING SYSTEMS IN
THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH KOREA
A. Who Is Subject To Transfer Pricing Adjustments?
Under U.S. law, companies "owned... directly or indirectly
by the same interests" 56 are subject to the provisions of Section
482.57 Because ownership represents factual determinations, own-
ership is easier to determine than Section 482's standard of direct
or indirect control by the same interests.58 The U.S. Treasury
Regulations provide that "control" includes any kind of control,
"whether legally enforceable and however exercised."' 59 A pre-
sumption of control also arises when companies shift income or
deductions without adhering to the arm's length requirement.
60
Korea's LCITA provides that a "special relationship" exists
between companies with cross ownership if:
(1) [A] transaction party directly or indirectly owns fifty percent
or more of the total number of shares entitled to vote in the
other transaction party; (2) a third-party directly or indirectly
owns fifty percent or more of the total number of shares enti-
tled to vote in both the transaction parties; or (3) one transac-
tion party can effectively decide business policy of the other
54. See generally Michael Happell, Southeast Asia: A Special Report Prepared by Mi-
chael Happell of Price Waterhouse, Melbourne, INT'L TAX REV., Apr. 1997, at 74 (arguing
that more relaxed enforcement of transfer pricing laws against foreign companies encour-
age such companies to leave profits within those countries).
55. See id.
56. I.R.C. § 482 (1997).
57. See id.
58. See Robertson, supra note 28, at 183.
59. Id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(3) (1995)).
60. See id. at 184.
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transaction party.
61
Despite such detail and broad scope, the LCITA does not
clarify whether an entity such as the Korean permanent establish-
ment of a foreign corporation would qualify as a related party.
62
The current policy of Korean tax authorities is that a permanent
establishment does not qualify as a related party.
63
B. Arm's Length As International Standard
Both the United States and South Korea tax codes contain
mechanisms recognizing the arm's length principle, as promul-
gated by the OECD Guidelines, 64 as the proper standard for de-
termining transfer pricing adjustments under each respective re-
gime.65 Criticism of the 1993 Regulations by taxpayers and foreign
tax authorities forced the U.S. Treasury and IRS to work with the
OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs to develop a mutually consis-
tent interpretation of the arm's length standard. 66 Under current
U.S. law, the goal of using "the arm's length standard is met if the
economic results of the 'controlled transaction' 67 are consistent
with results that would have been obtained if uncontrolled taxpay-
ers had engaged in a comparable transaction under comparable
61. LCITA art. 2(1) at 8.c.
62. See Yun, supra note 6, at 40.
63. See id.
64. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND TAX
ADMINISTRATIONS 1.6 (1995) (stating that the authoritative statement of the arm's length
principle is found in paragraph 1, article 9, of the OECD Model Tax Convention):
[When] conditions are made or imposed between . . .two [associated] enter-
prises in their commercial or financial relations which differ from those which
would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits which would,
but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason
of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that
enterprise and taxed accordingly.
Id.
65. See generally LCITA art. 5(1); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (enumerating
the arm's length standard as the basis for transfer pricing adjustments). The United States
has also included the arm's length standard in every income tax treaty. See 2 U.S.
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION AND TAX TREATIES § 18.03[1] n.1 (1997).
66. See Henry J. Birnkrant & James E. Croker, Jr., Transfer Pricing Final Regs. In-
crease Flexbility, But Not Certainty, in Choice of Method, 81 J. TAX'N 268 (1994).
67. A controlled transaction is a transaction between two related parties. See 2 U.S.
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION AND TAX TREATIES § 18.03[1] n.3 (1997) (citing Treas. Reg.
§ 1.482-1(i)(8)).
19981
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circumstances. "68
Critics argue that such a standard represents a significant de-
parture from the previous strict reliance on the use of comparable
transactions under the arm's length standard. 69 In other words,
the focus is not on the terms of the comparable transaction, but on
reaching a comparable result irrespective of the terms.70 This dis-
tinction means that an MNC can meet the goals of the arm's length
standard without necessarily resorting to a method that employs
the traditional standard of comparability.71  As discussed in
greater detail below, this has significant ramifications for the sys-
tems in both countries.
Korea enumerates the arm's length price as "the price which
is applied or determined to be applicable in an ordinary transac-
tion by and between a resident, domestic corporation, or a domes-
tic place of business and an unrelated party other than a foreign-
related party." 7
2
C. Establishment Of Best Method
Under U.S. law, the goal behind the best method concept is
allowing the taxpayer to determine the "best" or most reliable
method for determining an arm's length result. 73 This process can
be costly and time-consuming. The taxpayer's hardship is com-
pounded by the fact that the taxpayer is subject to second guessing
by the tax authorities' idea of what constitutes the "best
method. ' 74 The "best method" language, along with its accompa-
nying requirements, puts the taxpayer at the mercy of the tax
authorities.
68. 2 U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION AND TAX TREATIES § 18.03[1) (1997) (citing
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1)).
69. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 20, at 145.
70. See id.
71. See id. Comparability is measured by comparing operating profit of companies in
related business. If results are emphasized over profit, below market sales between re-
lated parties would be allowed.
72. Brian Park, Korea: Variations on OECD Theme, INT'L TAX REV., Feb. 1998, at
29.
73. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c)(1).
74. See 2 U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION AND TAX TREATIES § 18.03[3][a].
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In contrast to U.S. law, PED article 5(1) mandates that the
taxpayer select the most "reasonable" method for an arm's length
transaction. 75 Initially, such language may reveal Korean authori-
ties' willingness to give more deference to the taxpayer's choice of
pricing method. Despite this appearance, the two systems are
more alike than different.
1. Proof Of "Best Method" Through "Overpapering"
Section 482 requires that taxpayers prove through extensive
documentation that a particular method is not the best method.
76
Korea's PED does not require, however, what some call section
482's "overpapering." 77 PED article 7(1) merely requires the tax-
payer to select the most reasonable method, and report the rea-
sons for selection of this method.
78
In addition, section 482 requires a person to apply multiple
analyses to establish that the rejected methods are not the best
methods.79 The Regulations' standard states that a "taxpayer can
reasonably conclude that a specified method provided the most
reliable measure of an arm's length result only if it has made a rea-
sonable effort to evaluate the potential applicability of the other
specified methods in a manner consistent with the principles of the
best method rule."80 A reasonably thorough search for relevant
data accomplishes this purpose.
81
In applying such a standard, the amount of due diligence the
taxpayer must perform is unclear. 82  Moreover, the open-
endedness of this requirement can pose problems for smaller tax-
payers with limited resources. 83 Consequently, the taxpayer is
subject to what tax authorities conclude is a "reasonable" search
for relevant data.
75. See PED art. 5(1).
76. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6(d)(2)(ii).
77. See Marc M. Levey & Lawrence W. Shapiro, OECD Transfer Pricing Avoids
Overpapering the Best Method, 6 J. INT'L TAX'N 52, 54 (1995).
78. See PED art. 7(1). PED art. 5(1) seems consistent in this regard.
79. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6(d)(2)(ii).
80. Id.
81. See id.
82. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6(d)(2)(ii)(B). This section states that in "de-
termining the scope of a reasonably thorough search for data, the expense of additional
efforts to locate new data may be weighed against the likelihood of finding additional data
that would improve the reliability." Id. Such guidance seems quite subjective.
83. See Levey & Shapiro, supra note 77, at 54.
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2. Criteria For Determination Of The Best Method
The criteria for determining the "best method" is common to
both countries. For instance, U.S. law provides two basic factors
for determining the best method: 1) the degree of comparability
between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions; 84 and 2) the
completeness and accuracy of available data and assumptions, and
the sensitivity of the results to deficiencies in the data and assump-
tions.85 Similarly, Korea's PED provides four basic factors for de-
termining the best method. These criteria include: 1) the degree
of comparability between the controlled and uncontrolled transac-
tions; 2) the availability of data; 3) the high degree of conformity
of assumptions between the controlled and uncontrolled transac-
tions; and 4) the effect of deficiencies in data or assumptions on
the arm's length price.
86
Both sides generally agree as to the standard of comparability
for controlled and uncontrolled transactions. U.S. law refers to the
standards as the sufficiency of similarity between the two transac-
tions, as well as the applicability of adjustments for any deficien-
cies in comparability.87 Korea's PED provides that the differences
between controlled and uncontrolled transactions must not mate-
rially affect the comparison, and reasonably accurate adjustments
can eliminate such material differences. 88 Despite the similarities,
U.S. law appears to provide more flexibility by allowing the use of
a comparison, even if their comparability is not high and reason-
able adjustments do not eliminate material differences. 89 Con-
versely, Korea's PED does not provide for this added flexibility.90
D. Types Of Arm's Length Methods
1. Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method
The comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP) evaluates
price according to comparable goods or services transacted be-
tween independent parties that are identical or comparable to the
84. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c)(2)(i).
85. See id. at § 1.482-1(c)(2)(ii).
86. See PED art. 5(1).
87. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(2).
88. See PED art. 5(1).
89. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(2). Generally, such comparisons will not have a high
degree of reliability. See id.
90. See PED art. 5(1).
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controlled transaction in question. 91 Under this approach, the
U.S. Regulations stipulate that similarity of products between the
controlled and uncontrolled transactions will have the greatest im-
pact on the analysis. 92 Because of this, the comparable uncon-
trolled price method is often difficult to implement accurately.
93
a. Hierarchy of Methods
As mentioned previously under the "best method" rule, the
taxpayer must apply two factors: 1) the degree of comparability
between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions; and 2) the
quality of the data and assumptions used in the analysis. 94 With
these two standards in mind, the Regulations do not specify a hier-
archy or preference for one method of pricing over another:
95
[T]here is no strict priority of methods, and no method will in-
variably be considered to be more reliable than others. An
arm's length result may be determined under any method with-
out establishing the inapplicability of another method, but if
another method subsequently is shown to produce a more reli-
able measure of an arm's length result, such other method must
be used.
96
The Regulations indicate a slight preference for the CUP if
the analysis is based on closely comparable uncontrolled transac-
tions.97 Under CUP, "uncontrolled sales are compared to con-
trolled sales if their physical property and circumstances are nearly
identical with the physical property and circumstances of con-
trolled sales." 98 Some have argued that this method conveys the
most accurate reflection of an arm's length price since it reflects
"1) the price of sales made to unrelated customers; 2) the price of
sales from unrelated sellers to the company; and 3) the price of
sales between other unrelated parties." 99 Inherent in this concept
91. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(b)(1); see also LCITA art. 5(1) at 1.
92 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(b)(2)(ii)(A).
93. See id.
94. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c)(2).
95. See id. § 1.482-1(c)(1).
96. See id.
97. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c)(2)(i). "Data based on the results of transactions be-
tween unrelated parties provides the most objective basis for determining whether the re-
sults of a controlled transaction are arm's length." Id. § 1.482-1(c)(2).
98. Kim, supra note 3, at 413.
99. Id. "The comparable uncontrolled price is similar to the prevailing market price
when markets are perfectly competitive. Section 482 allows an adjusted market price if
1998]
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is the notion that the market acts as the most efficient and viable
pricing system using inputs and outputs to set a market or arm's
length price.
Korea takes a much different stance toward CUP than does
the United States. PED article 5 states that when an uncontrolled
transaction "with high degree of comparability ... is identified, the
CUP method. . . shall be considered as the method of determining
arm's length price in priority over any other methods."' 100 This
strong language denotes a much clearer preference by the Korean
authorities for the CUP method. Korean law favors use of CUP
"if substantially the same products are sold under substantially the
same circumstances, such as similarity in transaction period, level
of market and terms of transactions." 10 1 Differences should have
no effect on price, or the taxpayer should be able to adjust for such
differences.
102
The language gives a strong indication that Korean law, un-
like its U.S. counterpart, establishes a hierarchy and preference for
traditional transactional methods (e.g., comparable uncontrolled
price, resale price, and cost plus methods) over transactional profit
methods (e.g., profit split and transactional net margin meth-
ods).103  Furthermore, LCITA article 5(1) provides that the
"other" reasonable methods (i.e., profit split and transactional net
margin methods) "shall only be used ... if an arm's length price
cannot be determined by ... any of the [other] methods." This
language is consistent with the OECD Guidelines, which stipulate
that the transactional profit methods represent methods of "last
resort." 10
4
markets are less than perfectly competitive." Id at 413-14.
100. Kim, supra note 3, at 414. Such a strong preference for the CUP method, some
have argued, ignores the fact that the method is often impractical to implement. One ar-
gument is that products sold within the group are so unique that outside markets for the
goods do not exist. This makes it difficult to find comparables of uncontrolled transac-
tions. See id.
101. Park, supra note 72, at 29.
102. See id.
103. See Yun, supra note 6, at 40.
104. See Frances M. Horner, International Cooperation and Understanding: What's
New About the OECD's Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 589
(1996).
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b. Practical Implications
Empirical evidence shows that the majority of MNCs in the
world prefer to use transaction-based methods such as the compa-
rable uncontrolled price or resale price methods.10 5 These meth-
ods are preferable over profit based methods. The same is true
when a method's frequency of use is grouped by the type of trans-
action between two subsidiaries. 10 6 To further distinguish between
the two countries' laws, U.S. Regulations specifically provide that
in situations where a sale of a tangible property includes some in-
tangible property as well, it may be necessary to separate the com-
parability analysis.10 7 This occurs where the sale of a tangible
good might include such intangible rights as a trademark. 10 8 In
such a case, the analysis must include similar comparable prod-
ucts.10 9 In practice, this may be difficult to find because valuation
of intangibles such as goodwill or trademarks are case specific and
cannot be compared to other products or intangibles which are, by
nature, not similarly situated. Korea's law does not provide an ex-
ception for this important distinction.
2. Resale Price Method
Both countries provide for the use of the resale price method
(RPM). Under U.S. law, "[t]he resale price method measures an
arm's length price by subtracting the appropriate gross profit from
the applicable resale price for the property involved in the con-
trolled transaction under review." 110 "The appropriate gross profit
is computed by multiplying the applicable resale price by the gross
profit margin earned in comparable uncontrolled transactions.- 111
Gross profit margin is expressed as a percentage of total revenue
105. See Ernst & Young Transfer Pricing 1997 Global Survey, supra note 2, 1 51.
106. See id. 55. Basic grouping of transactions can be in the form of tangible versus
intangible goods or finished goods versus raw materials. See generally Kim, supra note 3,
at 407 (noting the difference in classifications).
107. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(f).
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(c)(2)(i). This method determines whether or not the price
charged in the controlled transactions is arm's length by looking at the gross profit margin
of a comparable uncontrolled transaction. See id. § 1.482-3(c)(1). This method is often
used when the taxpayer purchases and resells goods without any significant alteration of
the good's value. See id
111. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(c)(2)(iii).
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derived from sales.1
12
Korea's RPM states that "an arm's length price of an asset re-
fers to the price computed by subtracting an appropriate mark-up
amount from the price that a related party, who purchased the as-
set from another related party, would have received from an inde-
pendent uncontrolled party."" 3 Tax authorities compute an ap-
propriate mark-up by "applying the selling-based normal profit
rate to the purchaser's resale price to an uncontrolled party."'
114
The selling-based normal profit rate represents "the gross profit
rate realized by the purchaser from a transaction with an uncon-
trolled party."
115
Similarities between the two countries exist in the use of the
RPM. For example, Korea's law stipulates that the taxpayer shall
not significantly alter the value of the good resold. 116 This is an
important provision since the addition of significant value prior to
resale will make computing the resale profit margin more difficult.
Restriction of added value allows authorities to determine the re-
sale profit margin with relative ease. U.S. Regulations contain a
similar restriction.11 7
U.S. law, like Korean law, stipulates that in deriving compa-
rable gross profit margins, taxpayers should use their own pur-
chases and resales in comparable, uncontrolled transactions. 118 A
more accurate comparability analysis results from using the same
taxpayer's controlled and uncontrolled transactions.1 1 9 If the tax-
payer cannot find such comparables, it can look to other resel-
lers. 12
0
U.S. application of the RPM represents more of an operating
profit analysis rather than a gross profit analysis. 121 In other
words, the analysis has to make appropriate adjustments for func-
112. See id.
113. LCITA art. 5(1).
114. PED art. 8(1).
115. Id.
116. See Park, supra note 72, at 29. Under the Treasury Regulations, substantial al-
teration does not include "packaging, repackaging, labeling, or minor assembly." See
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(c)(1).
117. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(c)(1).
118. See i. § 1.482-3(c)(3)(ii); Park, supra note 72, at 30.
119. See id. § 1.482-3(c)(3)(ii).
120. Id.
121. See Marc M. Levey et al., Japan's Transfer Pricing System Is Evolving Along U.S.
Lines, 4 J. Int'l Tax'n 407, 410 (1993).
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tions performed and risks assumed. 122 Korea's PED article 6(2)
also provides for similar adjustment of profit margins. 123 Unlike
U.S. rules,124 however, Korea's PED does not enumerate the spe-
cific types of adjustments to gross profit margins. 125
A notable difference between the two laws involves intangible
products or services. The Treasury Regulations mention that "the
resale price method is not ordinarily used in cases where the con-
trolled taxpayer uses its intangible property to add substantial
value to the tangible goods." 126 It also specifically excludes the re-
sale price method from its list of enumerated methods for intangi-
bles. 12
7
In contrast, Korea's PED stipulates that "the resale price
method ... may be applicable to transactions of services or other
international transactions, if it is required to do so in order to rea-
sonably determine an arm's length price. ' 128 Such language does
not preclude using the resale price method on transactions involv-
ing intangible goods.
3. Cost Plus Method
Under U.S. law, the cost plus method "evaluates whether the
amount charged in a controlled transaction is arm's length by ref-
erence to the gross profit markup realized in comparable uncon-
trolled transactions. ' 129 This is done by adding an appropriate
gross profit to the controlled taxpayer's costs of production. 130
"The appropriate gross profit is computed by multiplying the con-
trolled taxpayer's cost of producing the transferred property by the
gross profit markup .... "131 U.S. law expresses the appropriate
122. See id. "[T]he advertising and warranty expenses borne by a distributor and the
issue of who owns the U.S marketing intangibles may cause adjustments to gross margins
resulting in something closer to operating margins." See id.
123. See PED art. 6(2).
124. See Levey et al., supra note 121, at 409.
125. See generally PED art. 6(2) (enumerating that reasonable adjustments should be
made for differences in functions performed, risks assumed and contractual conditions).
126. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(c)(1).
127. See id. § 1.482-4(a). This section enumerates only the comparable uncontrolled
transaction method, comparable profits method, profit split method, and unspecified
methods. See id.
128. PED art. 6(3).
129. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(d)(1).
130. See id. § 1.482-3(d)(2).
131. Id. § 1.482-3(d)(2)(ii).
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gross profit as a percentage of cost.132 The cost plus method ap-
plies when related parties are involved in the sale of manufactured,
assembled, or other produced goods.
133
Under U.S. regulations, the taxpayer should determine the
appropriate gross profit markup by reference to its own uncon-
trolled comparable transactions. 134 As with RPM, the justification
of the cost plus method is that the taxpayer will more likely find
similar characteristics among its own uncontrolled transactions.
135
Korea has also added this provision.
136
Korea's law stipulates that "an arm's length price... refers to
the price computed by adding the appropriate mark-up amount to
the cost incurred in purchasing, manufacturing or providing the as-
sets or services for the purpose of selling or providing the same as-
set or service to a related party."'137 The appropriate mark-up
amount is "computed by applying the cost-based normal profit
rate to the cost incurred by a seller of assets in purchasing, con-
structing or manufacturing at a normal price."'
138
Both the U.S. Regulations and Korea's provisions139 specifi-
cally provide for physical product comparability. In contrast, un-
der the CUP method, physical comparability is not provided for
and physical comparability is less important under the cost plus
method. 140 What is more important is that of functional compara-
bility. 1
41
4. Comparable Profits Method
Unlike section 482,142 the LCITA and PED wholly exclude
the comparable profits method (CPM). 143 Article 4 of the PED
132. See id.
133. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(d)(1).
134. See id. § 1.482-3(d)(3)(ii)(A).
135. See id.
136. See Park, supra note 72, at 30.
137. LCITA art. 5(1).
138. PED art. 8(2).
139. See Park, supra note 72, at 30.
140. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(d)(3)(ii)(B).
141. See id. § 1.482-3(d)(3)(ii)(A).
142. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(a) (authorizing use of CPM).
143. See LCITA art. 5(1) (providing for the use of comparable uncontrolled price
method, resale price method, cost plus method, and other reasonable methods provided
by the Presidential decree); see also PED art. 4 (stipulating that the "other reasonable
methods" referred to in LCITA art. 5 are the profit split method, the transactional net
margin method, and other methods that are considered reasonable). See PED art. 4.
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contains explicit inclusion of only the profit split method (PSM)
and the transactional net margin methods (TNMM) within the
"other" methods category. This further supports the view that Ko-
rean authorities intentionally excluded CPM.
The United States often uses CPM because of a lack of ability
to obtain transaction-based data for applying other methods, such
as the resale price or cost plus methods. 144 The CPM "evaluates
whether the amount charged in a controlled transaction is arm's
length based on objective measures of profitability (profit level in-
dicators) derived from uncontrolled taxpayers that engage in
similar business activities under similar circumstances.' 1 45 Profit
level indicators are the ratios between profits and costs incurred or
resources employed. 146 Examples of this include the rate of return
on capital employed, 147 operating profit to sales,148 and gross
profit to operating expenses. 149
a. Trends In International Community
Why does Korea disfavor use of CPM? Is this disfavor war-
ranted? Some have pointed to the fact that countries with greater
experience in applying traditional transaction methods are more
aware of the difficulties accompanying such methods.150 These
countries show more willingness to resort to transactional profit
methods151 (e.g., comparable profit, profit split methods). Mean-
while, developing countries are only now beginning to experience
the difficulties associated with applying traditional transaction
methods. 152
A similar trend may occur within Korea's transfer pricing sys-
tem. Perhaps the difference in view regarding CPM simply arises
from the fact that Korea's system, like many other less-developed
systems, has not had the same amount of time to develop.
144. See Levey et al.,supra note 121, at 411.
145. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5(a).
146. See id. § 1.482-5(b)(4).
147. See id. § 1.482-5(b)(4)(i).
148. See id. § 1.482-5(b)(4)(ii)(A).
149. See id. § 1.482-5(b)(4)(ii)(B).
150. See Happell, supra note 54, at 74. Writers have noted that the difficulties of find-
ing comparables in relation to such areas as performance functions or product similarity
may make resorting to profit methods more likely. See Birnkrant & Croker, Jr., supra
note 66, at 332.
151. See Birnkrant & Croker, Jr., supra note 66, at 332.
152. See iL
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b. Criticism From The International Community
Korea is not alone in its disfavor of CPM. The OECD com-
promised with the United States regarding the question of CPM as
an internationally viable method. 153 OECD documents show that
CPM is a method of "last resort. ' 154 Not only do the OECD
documents consider the CPM as a secondary method, they explic-
itly discourage its use.
155
The international community has two main criticisms of the
use of CPM. First, critics argue that the method is not based on
the arm's length principle. In other words, they maintain that the
arm's length standard should be based on a transactional ap-
proach, which looks at the price, not at the profitability of the
transaction. 156 This criticism recognizes that two unrelated firms
will set their prices in accordance with market conditions, and not
with respect to the profitability of other parties. 157 Because firms
cannot control external market conditions,158 the market price is
an accurate measure of an arm's length transaction. 159 These crit-
ics also argue that profitability is determined by internal factors
that vary widely between companies. 160 The second criticism of
153. See Borstell, supra note 2, at 5. Korea may argue that its position has the backing
of the OECD. The problem with this argument, however, is that the OECD's Guidelines
do not bind any country. See id- at 5.
154. See Birnkrant & Croker, Jr., supra note 66, at 333. Such last resort status would
make comparability less important for use of CPM than for other transaction methods.
See id.
155. See id. at 332. The language of the documents states that:
There are ... cases where transaction-based methods cannot be applied alone.
These would be considered cases of last resort .... In such cases of last resort,
practical considerations may suggest application of a profit-based method either
in conjunction with transaction-based methods or on its own. Nevertheless, for
the reasons set out in this report.., as a general matter the use of profit meth-
ods is discouraged.
Id.
156. See Sven-Olof Lodin, Is the American Approach Fair? - Some Critical Views on
the Transfer Pricing Issues, in ESSAYS ON INT'L TAX'N 265, 266 (Herbert H. Alpert &
Kees Van Raad eds., 1993).
157. See id. at 268.
158. See it at 266.
159. See generally id. (noting that prices determined by market conditions are equal for
all competitors).
160. See it at 266. Internal factors that have dramatically different effects on profit-
ability include salary cost level, productivity, transportation cost, rate of turnover, local
labor, safety legislations, management skill, organization of work, skill and training levels,
automation, R&D levels, effectiveness of advertising, and marketing success. See id. at
266-67.
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the use of CPM is that it is not in line with international prac-
tices.16
1
Furthermore, critics specifically opposed to the use of CPM
on Korean MNCs note that the special makeup of Korea's huge
conglomerates, commonly referred to as "chaebol," makes it im-
practicable to apply this method. The sheer size of Korean chae-
bol enables them to internalize costs and produce goods more
cheaply through economies of scale than can smaller U.S. domestic
companies. 162 Critics claim that CPM is based on "an unrealistic
assumption that all companies in [a] similar industry will and
should attain the same level of performance over long periods.' '163
The very nature of business competitiveness, the argument goes, is
that some firms will outperform others within the same industry.
By applying a rigid standard for measuring the comparability of
profits, CPM might be ignoring the competitive advantage chaebol
enjoys as a result of cross industry relationships. Additionally,
CPM ignores the alternative impetus for business transactions that
occur in the chaebol other than profit.
Despite such criticism, the use of CPM has its advantages.
For example, the method incorporates proven financial ratios,164
such as operating profit to sales and gross profit to operating ex-
penses. 165 Financial ratios represent universally accepted meas-
ures that transcend particular industries. Transactional differences
also have less of an affect on CPM than on traditional transac-
tional methods such as CUP. 166
c. Double The Cost Of Compliance
The difference in view between the United States and Korea
puts a taxpayer doing business in both countries at the risk of dou-
ble compliance costs. 167 A Korea-based MNC may need to apply
the CUP method even though it doesn't qualify as the "best
method" under U.S. law. 168 Similarly, the IRS may require the use
161. See id. at 268.
162. See generally Yang, supra note 1, at 483 (noting that huge Korean companies
known as "multi-national import-export companies" have such a characteristic).
163. Id.
164. See Levey & Shapiro, supra note 77, at 58.
165. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5 (b)(4)(ii)(A)-(B).
166. See Levey & Shapiro, supra note 77, at 58.
167. See Lodin, supra note 156, at 269.
168. See Charles F. Connolly, The New Transfer Pricing and Penalty Regulations: In-
creased Compliance, Increased Burdens, and the Search for a Safe Harbor, 16 U. PA. J.
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of CPM as the "best method" even though Korea does not recog-
nize it.169 To comply with both systems, the competing tax
authorities may require an MNC to use two different methods.
170
Such problems can double the cost of compliance' 71 and highlight
the need for more consistency and cooperation between the two
countries' systems.
d. What Could Korea Do?
One practical barrier to Korea's use of CPM might be the
availability of data. Sufficient data represents one of the crucial
determinants of an appropriate profit level indicator. 172 This
could be a serious problem for companies in Korea where financial
information is not as readily available for outside use.173 Even
when such information is available, it is not always in electronic
form, making its use inefficient. 174 The U.S. Regulations under-
score this practical barrier by stipulating that "profit level indica-
tors based solely on internal data may not be used because they
are not objective measures of profitability derived from operations
of uncontrolled taxpayers."'
175
Despite the structural difficulties, Korea should consider the
practical difficulties of finding strict comparable transactions and
resort to a more flexible approach when it comes to the CPM. Ko-
rea's strict standard of comparability restricts use of the CPM. In
this regard, Korea could adopt the U.S. approach of making the
"degree of functional comparability required to obtain a reliable
result under the comparable profits method less than that required
under the resale price or cost plus methods."
176
INT'L Bus. L. 339, 355-56 (1995).
169. See id. at 356. Despite the practical conveniences in applying CPM, Korea's ad-
vantage is the support of the OECD and a majority of the international community in not
applying CPM.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5(b)(4).
173. See generally Yang, supra note 1, (noting that the database of company informa-
tion is generally not available or applicable to taxpayers' situation).
174. See Park, supra note 72, at 32.
175. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5(b)(4)(iii). In other words, U.S. law does not allow the use of
the taxpayer's own internal data to determine the CPM. It does, however, allow for the
use of the taxpayer's own internal data in computing comparables for other methods such
as the resale price or cost plus methods. See id § § 1.482-3(c)(3)(ii)(A) to -3(d)(3)(ii)(A).
176. Id. § 1.482-5(c)(2)(ii).
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If Korea bases its disfavor of the use of CPM on the criticism
that the method is inconsistent with the arm's length standard, the
disfavor is unwarranted. For instance, the profit split method, as
mentioned below, does not rely on the strict use of comparable
transactions. 177 Despite this fact, Korean law allows for its use.
An inconsistency exists if this is the reason for Korea's rejection of
CPM.
Korea could also develop an approach where it allows for use
of CPM if, upon demand by the authorities, the taxpayer cannot
produce sufficient records to determine an arm's length approach
under one of the other methods.178 This may be a practical solu-
tion to the problem of finding strict comparables under the other
above-mentioned methods.
179
5. Profit Split Method
Korean and U.S. laws both provide for the use of another
profit method, known as the profit split method (PSM). 180 The
PSM involves two different approaches. These include the compa-
rable PSM 181 and residual PSMs.18
2
Under U.S. law, "[t]he profit split method evaluates whether
the allocation of the combined operating profit or loss attributable
to one or more controlled transactions is arm's length by reference
to the relative value of each controlled taxpayer's contribution to
that combined operating profit or loss."183 Korea's provision of
the PSM is similar in scope. 184
177. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 20, at 146. Avi-Yonah states that the "residual profit
split method is clearly not within the traditional arm's length standard because it does not
rely on comparables in making the crucial determination about splitting the residual." Id.
178. See Levey et al., supra note 121, at 410. Japanese authorities use this approach.
See id.
179. See id. at 411. Transactions such as CUP are sometimes rare. See id Data also
may not be sufficiently available for applying the resale or cost plus methods. See id.
180. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6; PED art. 4. Korean authorities give preference among
transactional profit methods to the profit split method over the transactional net margin
method. See Yun, supra note 6, at 40.
181. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6(c)(2).
182. See id. § 1.482-6(c)(3).
183. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6(a).
184. See generally PED art. 4. "This method is to allocate the combined net operating
profit derived by both parties in an international transaction between a resident.., and its
overseas related party ... based on the relative value of each party's contribution to the
combined profit .... " Id.
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The comparable PSM approach, under U.S. law, allocates the
combined operating profit by looking at the operating profit of un-
controlled taxpayers. 185 The taxpayer compares the relative profit
percentage of the uncontrolled taxpayers to its own profit, and
then allocates the profit from its controlled transaction accord-
ingly. 18
6
U.S. law also allows for the use of a residual PSM. The tax-
payer can use this approach where either party to the transaction
owns significant intangible property. 187 The intangibles may pro-
duce a residual profit that is higher than the profit resulting from
the parties' routine functions. 188 In applying the PSM to such
cases, the taxpayer first allocates the routine operating income to
each controlled party by using the combined operating profit allo-
cation of comparable uncontrolled taxpayers. 189 The taxpayer
must use a functional analysis to determine the contributions ac-
cording to "functions performed, risks assumed, and resources
employed by each of the controlled taxpayers." 190
Once the taxpayer establishes the above, the U.S. Regulations
require the taxpayer to determine the residual profit split. 191 Basi-
cally, this involves determining which party bore the expenses for
developing the intangible good.192 In other words, the residual
profit split allows the controlled taxpayer to single out profit at-
tributable to valuable intangibles that uncontrolled taxpayers
might not own. 193 In this step, the taxpayer divides the residual
profit among the controlled taxpayers. 194 This is done according
to the value of each controlled party's relative contribution. 195
Korean law allows the taxpayer to apply either a contribution
or residual analysis.196 Under the contribution analysis, "the com-
bined net operating profit ... would be divided between the re-
185. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6(c)(2)(i).
186. See id.
187. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 20, at 146.
188. See id. These routine functions are "contributions of the same or a similar kind to
those made by uncontrolled taxpayers involved in similar business activities for which it is
possible to identify market returns." Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6(c)(3)(i)(A).
189. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6(c)(3)(i)(A).
190. Id.
191. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6(c)(3)(i)(B).
192. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 20, at 146.
193. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6 (c)(3)(i)(B).
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See Yun, supra note 6, at 40.
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lated parties based on the relative value of each party's contribu-
tion to the combined profit.' 197 The combined profit could be the
total profit from the transaction or a residual profit that cannot be
readily assigned. 198 The method then allocates the relative contri-
bution on the basis of uncontrolled parties. 199 Under a residual
analysis, the taxpayer allocates an appropriate portion of basic in-
come from its basic transaction type.200 The method then allocates
the remaining residual profit.
20 1
The two sides are similar in the language that deals with the
factors used in the contribution analysis. For instance, U.S. law
stipulates that the "relative value of each controlled taxpayer's
contribution to the success of the relevant business activity must
be determined in a manner that reflects the functions performed,
risks assumed, and resources employed by each participant in the
relevant business activity." 20 2  In similar fashion, Korean law
stipulates the factors as:
[T]he amount of expenses disbursed or to be disbursed for pur-
chasing, manufacturing or selling assets or rendering services;
the amount of capital expenditure incurred, the total value of
assets used or risks assumed in developing assets or rendering
services; the functions performed at each stage of the transac-
tion; and other reasonable measurable allocation criteria.20 3
Some claim that PSM represents a departure from a strict de-
pendence on comparable transactions. 204 Unlike the comparable
profit method, the residual PSM approach looks only to the profit-
ability of the MNC under examination, and not to other "compa-
rable" entities. 205 For instance, the taxpayer does not have to rely
on a comparable uncontrolled transaction when splitting the resid-
ual profit.206 In this regard, PSM does away with the difficulty of
197. Id.
198. See Park, supra note 72, at 30.
199. See Yun, supra note 6, at 40.
200. See id. at 41.
201. See id
202. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6(b).
203. PED art. 4 at 1.a-l.d.
204. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 20, at 146.
205. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
(OECD), TAX ASPECTS OF TRANSFER PRICING WITHIN MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES, THE UNITED STATES PROPOSED REGULATIONS IN OECD DOCUMENTS
3.12 (1993).
206. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 20, at 146.
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finding comparables similar to the taxpayer, which is especially dif-
ficult in areas such as managerial efficiency. 20 7 Because of such
factors, the method may deviate from the traditional requirements
of an arm's length transaction.
20 8
E. Documentation
1. Level Of Documentation Required
The level of documentation required under the two systems
represents an important distinction. Taxpayers may use such
documentation as proof that they determined the transfer price
under the reported method.20 9 The U.S. system requires the tax-
payer to produce documents in existence at the time the taxpayer
filed the return.210 In contrast, article 11 of LCITA and article 19
of PED do not mention such a requirement. Although article 19
does mention the kind of information that the tax authorities may
request, 211 the provision merely limits the scope of such informa-
tion.21
2
This distinction between the kind and scope of information is
important for the MNC. Under U.S. law, the contemporaneous
documentation requirement can be tremendously burdensome and
time-consuming. 213 The Korean law more closely resembles the
OECD's approach,214 which does not require contemporaneous
documentation. 215 The drafters of the OECD Guidelines believed
that taxpayers would be overburdened by such an approach.216
Although tax authorities may require proof during audit, Korea's
provision does not impose any penalties for failure to keep con-
temporaneous documentation. 217 LCITA does, however, require
an MNC in Korea to submit detailed information regarding certain
207. See OECD, supra note 205, at 3.12.
208. See id.
209. See I.R.C. § 6662(e)(3)(B)(i)(II).
210. See id.
211. See PED art. 19.
212. See id. PED art. 19 (limiting the scope of documents the tax authorities may re-
quest).
213. See generally Marc M. Levey & Lawrence W. Shapiro, OECD Transfer Pricing
Draft Targets Excessive Documentation, 6 J. INT'L TAX'N 244, 248 (1995).
214. See generally id; Cf. LCITA art. 11 and PED art. 19.
215. See Park, supra note 72, at 32.
216. See Levey & Shapiro, supra note 213, at 249.
217. See LCITA art. 11; see also PED art. 19.
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transactions with related overseas parties.218 As a practical matter,
this may force MNCs in Korea to keep contemporaneous docu-
mentation.
219
2. Time Requirement
The Korean law also shows greater flexibility in the time it
gives the taxpayer to comply with the tax authorities' request for
documentation. Article 11(3) of LCITA provides the taxpayer
sixty days to comply with a request.220 Tax authorities have the
discretion to grant an extension of another sixty days if the tax-
payer presents a justifiable reason.221 In contrast, Internal Reve-
nue Code (I.R.C.) section 6662(e)(3) authorizes a thirty day limit
for similar requests. 222 A thirty day notice might prove somewhat
burdensome, especially considering the complexity of today's
MNCs. As a consequence, the sixty days provided by the LCITA
better reflects the needs of today's business environment.
3. Differences in Policy
Between the two countries, the United States has a more pro-
active approach to document production. 223 In requesting docu-
mentation, U.S. authorities do not have the burden of establishing
a presumption of transfer of profits abroad. 2
24
Such differences also explain why some companies may have
problems providing proper documentation to the IRS.225 If an af-
filiate of a Korean company operates in the United States, U.S.
authorities may require the company affiliate or the Korean com-
pany to adhere to stricter documentation standards than those in
Korea. 226
218. See LCITA art. 11(1).
219. See Park, supra note 72, at 32.
220. See LCITA art. 11(3).
221. See id.
222. See I.R.C. § 6662(e)(3)(B)(II).
223. See Marc M. Levey & Pierre-Sebastien Thill, Transfer Pricing in France Moves
Closer to the U.S. Approach, 7 J. INT'L TAX'N 388, 393 (1996).
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See id.
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F. Exceptions To Use Of Penalty Provisions
Under certain circumstances, both systems provide exception
to their respective penalty provisions. 227 Under the U.S. rules, the
taxpayer must show that "there was a reasonable cause ... and
that the taxpayer acted in good faith" in determining the taxable
income.228 The exception has both an objective and subjective
component. 229 The objective element deals with the possession
and use of documentation. 230 This element examines: 1) the expe-
rience and knowledge of the taxpayer, including all members of
the taxpayer's controlled group; and 2) the extent to which the
taxpayer had access to reliable data and analyzed it in a reliable
manner.231 The taxpayer can also take into consideration the cost
of additional efforts in obtaining new data.232 The subjective ele-
ment requires the taxpayer to go through multiple analyses to de-
termine that the applied method represents the most reasonable
method. 233
The U.S. standards make successful invocation of the penalty
exception provision extremely difficult.234 With such stringent re-
quirements, a taxpayer may have difficulty avoiding penalties.
Korea's transfer pricing laws also provide for an exception to
its penalty provisions. 235 Use of the exception requires the fol-
lowing: 1) the taxpayer presents the procedure for arriving at the
most reasonable method; 2) the taxpayer actually uses the method
selected; and 3) the taxpayer keeps the necessary data and infor-
mation related to the method. 236 The law does not mention a re-
227. See PED art. 23; see also Treas. Reg. § 6664(c).
228. Treas. Reg. § 6664(c). Before this exception can apply, the taxpayer must meet an
additional requirement as set forth in Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4T(d) which states that a "tax-
payer that does not satisfy the rules of section 1.6662-6(d) for a net section 482 adjustment
cannot satisfy the reasonable cause and good faith exception under section 6664(c)."
Connolly, supra note 168, at n.105.
229. See Connolly, supra note 168, at 360.
230. See id.
231. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6(d)(2)(ii)(A) and (B); see also Birnkrant & Croker, Jr.,
supra note 66, at 272.
232. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6(d)(2)(ii)(B); see also Birnkrant & Croker, Jr., supra
note 66, at 272.
233. See id. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6(d)(2)(ii).
234. See generally Connolly, supra note 168, at 272. Connolly argues that the Regula-
tions "require overly broad searches and are not clear as to how great a self-compliance
effort a taxpayer must undertake to avoid penalties." Id.
235. See PED art. 23.
236. See id.
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quirement of multiple analyses.237 As a result, the taxpayer seems
to have a much better chance of invoking the penalty avoidance
exception.
G. Advance Pricing Agreements
Both the U.S. and Korean transfer pricing systems allow tax-
payers to use advance pricing agreements (APAs). APAs repre-
sent formal agreements between tax authorities and taxpayers
that, for a fixed period of time, predetermine the method of the
arm's length price. 238 MNCs that use the APA process note that
such arrangements provide certainty to the taxpayer.239 APAs can
also help avoid double taxation and costly examinations. 240 Al-
though APAs provide potential benefits to the parties involved,
they come with significant investments of time and money.241
Thus, the large multinational company with substantial resources
is more likely to take advantage of the APA provisions, 242 thereby,
putting the relatively smaller companies at a disadvantage.
Korea's APA arrangement details significant conditions by
which the tax authorities can cancel APAs. The law stipulates that
authorities can cancel APAs in the event that revision of relevant
laws or regulations render contents of the APA inappropriate. 243
If authorities can cancel an APA under the stipulated conditions,
taxpayers may consider the risk of cancellation too great a cost.
Although the same provision does allow the taxpayer to change
the affected portions of the APA,244 it is questionable whether this
provides adequate protection. The value of the APA within Ko-
rean transfer pricing is subject to scrutiny. The ability of tax
authorities to cancel APAs will hurt MNCs who rely on such
agreements for prolonged periods of time. If authorities can can-
cel agreements on the aforementioned grounds, companies might
consider the risk too great.
237. See id.
238. See LCITA art. 6; see also Kayfetz & HeIzel, supra note 31, at 210.
239. See Kayfetz & Heizel, supra note 31, at 210.
240. See Ernst & Young, supra note 2, 27.
241. See id.
242. See Birnkrant & Croker, Jr., supra note 66, at 272.
243. See PED art. 13(1).
244. See id. art. 13(3).
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H. Differences In Political And Business Cultures
The differences in content and scope of the laws in the United
States and South Korea might have their roots in structural differ-
ences that stem from political, economic, and cultural norms. In
other words, countries have different structural reasons for imple-
menting particular systems of taxation.
1. Comparison Of Political Cultures
Some writers note that the major difference separating Pacific
Rim nations from Western nations is the disparity of coordination
between a nation's tax policy and its industrial policy.245 For ex-
ample, governments in Pacific Rim countries implement tax poli-
cies that are in close coordination with economic policies.246 This
allows them to indirectly guide a corporation's business strategy.247
In contrast, American political culture mandates the importance of
a free-enterprise system. 248 As a result, corporations operate in a
much more decentralized political environment than their Asian
counterparts. 24
9
Why are these differences important for implementing trans-
fer pricing laws such as section 482? A simple answer does not
exist. Nonetheless, exploring the overall effects of a stringent
transfer pricing system, or tax policy for that matter, will uncover
the impact on economic competitiveness.
Strict enforcement of transfer pricing may impact foreign di-
rect investment.250 For example, a decrease in foreign direct in-
vestment will subsequently decrease the value of a nation's cur-
rency.251 Although a weakened currency provides for increased
exports, it also increases real interest rates as demand for invest-
ments decrease. 252 Overall, a decrease in available capital impacts
the amount of capital available for a nation's debt reduction.253
245. See Karen V. Kole, Tax Concerns for Pacific Rim Multi-nationals Doing Business
in the United States, 25 U.S.F. L. REV. 449,452 (1991).
246. See id. at 453.
247. See id.
248. See id
249. See id.
250. See Kole, supra note 245, at 458.
251. See id. at 459.
252. See id.
253. See id.
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This illustrates the need for a transfer pricing system that
takes a country's economic goals into consideration. If a nation is
serious about attracting foreign direct investment, a system more
favorable to MNCs will benefit such a goal.254 In support of this
assertion, Korea's current dependence and focus on attracting for-
eign investors will play a key role in formulating its tax policies.
Although it is a generalization to say that the United States is not
as dependent on foreign investment, we can see the contrast in fo-
cus between the two countries. Furthermore, Korea's centralized
approach to economic policy-making creates an environment
where government can synthesize various competing policies. It is
true, however, that the U.S. system provides evidence of a strong
democracy at work.
2. Comparison Of Business Cultures
The difference in business cultures of the East and West rep-
resents another important distinction. The Japanese keiretsu, or
vertically integrated companies, present a prime example of this
distinction.255 Keiretsu are normally centered around a parent
company or bank institution256 with interlinking ownership.257
This ownership takes the form of "interlocking directorates, presi-
dential councils, group-member shareholding, lending preferences,
few intra-group competitors, and intra-group grading. ' 258 Mem-
ber firms have tremendous advantages in loan accessibility, re-
duced interest rates, and access to distribution systems. 259 Despite
Japan's Anti-monopoly Act, the country's industrial policy favors
huge monopolistic ventures that center around incredibly strong
parent companies. 260  This directly contrasts with U.S. anti-
monopoly policy, which promotes competitive markets. 261 This
policy difference creates difficulty for the U.S. application and en-
forcement of section 482.262 For example, establishing the element
of direct or indirect control proves difficult.263 Without this de-
254. See id. at 461.
255. See Robertson, supra note 28, at 189.
256. See id. at 187.
257. See id.
258. Id. at 187-88.
259. See id. at 188.
260. See id. at 189.
261. See Robertson, supra note 28, at 189.
262. See id..
263. See id. It is not easy to establish control. See id.
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termination, a basis for a section 482 investigation does not exist.
The significance of the problem in applying section 482 ad-
justments to the keiretsu is informative. The keiretsu's structure,
although different in many respects, is similar to the Korean model
of conglomerate companies known as chaebol.264 Chaebol compa-
nies share many of the characteristics of keiretsu companies. The
interlocking ownership between member firms of the chaebol and
the keiretsu represent one such similarity.265 Much like Japan's
government, Korea's government has actively fostered monopolis-
tic development of chaebol companies through access to preferen-
tial loans by state-influenced banking institutions266 and a prefer-
ential regulatory environment.267  During early periods of
economic development, both the Japanese and Korean govern-
ments fostered particular industries.
268
Such cultural preferences impact transfer pricing adjustments.
Because Japan and other Asian countries favor a producer-
oriented society,269 those countries place greater emphasis on the
manufacturing process.270 This directly contrasts with consumer-
oriented countries such as the United States, 271 which inevitably
places more emphasis on marketing than on manufacturing.272
The practical impact of such differences is that a Japanese or
Korean manufacturer with a U.S. distribution subsidiary, will allo-
cate more of its profits to the manufacturing process than to the
distribution process.273 A Japanese or Korean MNC's reliance on
manufacturing more likely makes the profit of such a company
subject to the U.S. practice of IRS adjustment.274 These differ-
264. See MYUNG H. KANG, THE KOREAN BUSINESS CONGLOMERATE 63 (1996).
Early form of Japanese companies known as zaibatsu was broken up by the Supreme
Command of Allied Powers ("SCAP") after World War II. See id at 72. Keiretsu, or a
vertically-integrated company, emerged post WWII. See id. at 74.
265. See Yoshimura, supra note 11, at 420. "A consistent dividends payment among
member corporations maintains prosperity within the group." Id
266. See SOON CHO, THE DYNAMICS OF KOREAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 36
(1994).
267. See id.
268. See id. The Korean government targeted certain areas such as heavy, chemical,
and export-oriented industries. See id at 42.
269. See generally Levey et al., supra note 121, at 408.
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. See id.
273. See id.
274. See generally Levey et el., supra note 121, at 408.
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ences show the importance of understanding the structural differ-
ences that potentially play an important part in transfer pricing.
275
Furthermore, foreign subsidiaries of Japanese companies are
prone to shift income to their parent companies in Japan.276 The
motivation for such transfer of income is not tax-avoidance, but
"business reasons related to corporate strategy, such as improving
financial statements." 277 The subsidiary's relative lack of bar-
gaining power plays a role in such profit transfers.
278
These observations are informative for our discussion of the
chaebol. Especially as recent events make chaebols strapped for
sources of financing,279 parent companies might increasingly
choose to sacrifice their subsidiaries' profitability for the good of
the parent.28
0
This raises the interesting question of whether or not tax
authorities, such as the IRS, should consider the business and fi-
nancial motivations of chaebols in making appropriate transfer
pricing adjustments. This becomes even more important in light of
Korea's recent financial problems.
VI. CONCLUSION
The complexity of today's MNCs necessitates increasingly
complex transfer pricing systems that will keep in step with the
MNCs. Although the potential for tax avoidance is great, tax
authorities in the United States and Korea must also remember
that companies are principally in business to make a profit and not
to avoid taxes. A fair and adequate system will keep this crucial
point in mind when implementing rules. A balanced approach to
taxation that factors in this important element will find adherents
and proponents throughout the world community. This does not,
however, negate the potential for income shifting.281
275. See id.
276. See Yoshimura, supra note 11, at 417.
277. Id.
278. See id. at 417-18.
279. See id. at 418.
280. See Kim, supra note 3, at 410. Strong financial statements increase the likelihood
of securing financing for cash-strapped Korean companies. See id.
281. See id. at 408.
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As a body of law, Korea's transfer pricing system lacks the
complexity and detail of its U.S. counterpart. We do see, however,
a system that is not far behind in scope and concept. We also see a
system that is fairly close in line with Korea's current economic
objectives. Korea's transfer pricing laws show an effort to imple-
ment internationally-accepted principles of taxation. Despite its
current day economic problems, Korea's transfer pricing system
will continue to develop along international standards.
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